Abstract. We introduce a notion of fairness in the models for sponsored search auctions that provides a chance to new advertisers, as well as, lower budget advertisers to obtain better slots. This enables the search engines (i.e., auctioneers) to estimate the quality or relevance scores for new advertisers, and to better cater to the advertisers in the tail, and thereby encourage more advertisers to participate. We show that such a fairness policy can be incorporated without any significant loss in revenue for the auctioneer, and potentially a gain in the long term, as more players find it profitable and easier to join the game. Additionally, the social value, i.e., efficiency, as measured by the combined value of the auctioneer's profit and the payoffs of all the bidders, might actually increase. We study revenue and incentive properties of mechanisms for implementing fairness, and justify the above statements.
Introduction
With the growing popularity of web search for obtaining information, sponsored search advertising, where advertisers pay to appear alongside the algorithmic/organic search results, has become a significant business model today and is largely responsible for the success of Internet Search giants such as Google and Yahoo!. In this form of advertising, the Search Engine allocates the advertising space using an auction. Advertisers bid upon specific keywords. When a user searches for a keyword, the search engine (the auctioneer) allocates the advertising space to the bidding merchants based on their bid values and their ads are listed accordingly. Usually, the sponsored search results appear in a separate section of the page designated as "sponsored" above or to the right of the organic/algorithmic results and have similar display format as the algorithmic results. Each position in such a list of sponsored links is called a slot. Whenever a user clicks on an ad, the corresponding advertiser pays an amount specified by the auctioneer. Generally, users are more likely to click on a higher ranked slot, therefore advertisers prefer to be in higher ranked slots and compete for them.
From the above description, we can note that after merchants have bid for a specific keyword, when that keyword is queried, the auctioneer follows two steps. First, she allocates the slots to the advertisers depending on their bid values. Normally, this allocation is done using some ranking function. Secondly, she decides, through some pricing scheme, how much a merchant should be charged if the user clicks on her ad and in general this depends on which slot she got, on her bid and that of others. In the auction formats for sponsored search, there are two ranking functions namely rank by bid (RBB) and rank by revenue(RBR) and there are two pricing schemes namely generalized first pricing (GFP) and generalized second pricing(GSP) which have been used widely. In RBB, bidders are ranked according to their bid values. The advertiser with the highest bid gets first slot, that with the second highest bid get the second slot and so on. In RBR, the bidders are ranked according to the product of their bid value and quality score. The quality score represents the merchant's relevance to the specific keyword, which can basically be interpreted as the possibility that her ad will be viewed if given a slot irrespective of what slot position she is given. In GFP, the bidders are essentially charged the amount they bid and in GSP they are charged an amount which is enough to ensure their current slot position. For example, under RBB allocation, GSP charges a bidder an amount equal to the bid value of the bidder just below her.
Formal analysis of such sponsored search advertising model has been done extensively in recent years, from algorithmic as well as from game theoretic perspective [6, 5, 4, 3, 7, 1, 2] . In a formal setup, there are K slots to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders. A bidder i has a true valuation t i (known only to the bidder i) for the specific keyword and she bids v i . The expected click through rate of an ad put by bidder i when allocated slot j has the form γ j e i , i.e., separable into a position effect and an advertiser effect. γ j 's can be interpreted as the probability that an ad will be noticed when put in slot j and it is assumed that γ 1 > γ 2 > · · · > γ K > 0. e i can be interpreted as the probability that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked on if noticed and is referred to as the relevance of bidder i. This is the quality score used in the RBR allocation rule mentioned earlier. The payoff/utility of bidder i when given slot j at a price of p is given by e i γ j (t i − p) and they are assumed to be rational agents trying to maximize their payoffs.
As of now, Google as well as Yahoo! use schemes that can be accurately modeled as RBR with GSP. The bidders are ranked according to e i v i and the slots are allocated as per these ranks. For simplicity of notation, assume that the ith bidder is the one allocated slot i according to this ranking rule, then i is charged an amount equal to ei+1vi+1 ei
. The revenue and incentive properties of this model has been thoroughly analyzed in the above mentioned articles. In our present work, we take a new direction beyond this classical framework by introducing a notion of fairness. We start with our motivation for the fair model in Section 2 and formally describe this model called CFFM in the Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we analyze the revenue and incentive properties of CFFM under GFP and GSP respectively and in Section 6, we focus our attention to the revenue comparison under a simplified GSP scheme at symmetric Nash equilibria. Section 7 is devoted to the study of efficiency comparison and the discussions on which slots should be designated fair is presented in the Section 8. Further, we describe how to estimate the quality scores (relevance) of new advertisers using the fair mechanisms in Section 9 and conclude our discussions in Section 10 with directions for future studies motivated by the present work.
Why Fairness?
In the usual model described in Section 1, it is implicitly assumed that the auctioneer knows the relevance e i 's, but in practice, this is not entirely true as new advertisers do also join the game. Further, it is also assumed that the bidders know their true valuations accurately and bid accordingly, and high budget advertisers and low budget advertisers (e.g., mom-and-pop businesses) have similar awareness and risk levels. In reality, a low budget advertiser might not know his true value and what to bid, and might also not be able to bid high due to the potential risks involved. Certainly, a model that automatically allows one to estimate these parameters, i.e., the auctioneer can estimate the relevance of as many bidders as possible, and the advertisers are able to figure out their valuations and can bid more efficiently, is desirable. Furthermore, in thinking about whether to switch from one mechanism to another, it is not enough to look at the mechanisms in isolation (as is usually done in existing analysis) but one needs to also analyze the effect each mechanism has on the overall pool of bidders that it intends to attract. In the usual analysis and comparison studies, the pool of bidders and their available resources are considered fixed and the same for all the mechanisms. However, different mechanisms could provide different incentives for their bidders, so that in the longer term, a mechanism might prove better for the auctioneer by causing an increased number of bidders, who are willing to invest more.
Motivated largely by the above points, we introduce the notion of fairness in the adword model. In this framework, there are specified slots that are designated as fair. The auctioneer decides upon which bidders qualify for the fair slots, and the bidders who qualify are given an equal chance to appear in the fair slots. The criteria for qualification are chosen so that a wider variety of bidders can be included. Therefore, with fairness, the lowly ranked bidders are also given a chance to obtain attractive slots. This can potentially result in attracting the pools of advertisers from the tail to participate and increase their marketing budgets, as they discover the effectiveness of their ads. High budget bidders are also not worse off, because the fair slots need not necessarily be at the top and there can be various pools of fair slots scattered throughout. Moreover, the high budget bidders can participate in the usual auction for the rest of the slots and maintain their competitive advantage. In general, the quality of the fair slots can be chosen so that advertisers have the chance to obtain better slots, but not necessarily the top ones, depending on their bids and other parameters. Further, although the risk of the lower budget advertisers seems to be shifting to the auctioneer, we show that the auctioneer does not lose significantly in terms of revenue even in short term. More importantly, she is automatically able to obtain critical information, and can potentially test a new pool of advertisers, which in turn might lead to an efficient monetization from the tail and potentially a gain in long-term revenue. Thus, the auctioneer may see the the fair slots as an investment or the price she pays to learn the quality of a larger pool of bidders, and to provide incentives for bidders to increase their budget and participate more actively in the auction.
In the next section, we formally introduce this fair model which is collusion free in the sense that bidders do not trivially have incentives to collude. To illustrate this point, suppose all the slots are made fair and everyone is given an equal chance for obtaining each slot, then since all bidders are essentially getting the same quality of service they can collectively agree upon a minimum possible bid value and the auctioneer will lose severely in revenues. The model presented in this paper avoids such collusion possibility. Further, it seems that this fair model makes more sense for the frequent keywords where a bigger pool of advertisers can be accommodated. There is no reason why one should use the same mechanisms for frequent and infrequent keywords; one can still use the standard model for the infrequent keywords while adopting the fair model for frequent ones.
A Collusion Free Fair Model (CFFM)
There are N bidders bidding for a specific keyword and this keyword appears several times a day. There are K slots out of which we will choose some L slots (for example top ones) for fairness and call them fair slots. Bidder i has a true valuation t i (known only to her) for this keyword and she has a budget b i which is soft in the sense that she can stay up to n ( ≤ N ) steps if she participates for fair slots. The new auction framework has the following features.
-Bidders report their bids v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v N .
-Auctioneer determines the set F of n bidders who qualify for the fair slots. Here L < n ≤ K < N and as we shall see later we choose n > 2L. We assume that this decision is made using some ranking rule. -Auctioneer uses a ranking rule A to order the bidders (for example by bid or by revenue). Let us name the bidders according to this ranking, i.e., bidder m is the one ranked m according to A. This is the initial ordering, i.e., the ordering at step 1. -This order is cyclicly shifted for n − 1 more steps to complete a round of n steps. Thus the initial ordering
in step 3 and so on. A bidder will be called fair-active if this cyclicly rotating rule assigns her one of the L slots designated fair. In the Sections 4 through 7, we will do the analysis for the model where the L fair slots are taken to be the top L slots; however, the analysis essentially remains similar for the other cases as well. In fact in Section 8, we argue about which slots should be made fair. -The rotating round of n steps ensures that each one of the n bidders gets to each fair slot exactly once, thus they are fair-active for exactly L steps out of the n steps. -Bidders from F who are not fair-active at a particular step compete among themselves and with bidders not in F for non-fair slots. This ensures that bidders in F do not collude for the fair slots because they are still competing and hence not getting the same quality of service.
To simplify the analysis in the following sections we assume that the click through rates(CTR) just depend on the slot position and not on the particular bidder i.e. the probability that an ad will be clicked when placed in slot m is γ m irrespective of who is the advertiser. The case when CTR is also effected by the identity of the advertiser is a straightforward generalization of this and in particular the incentive properties does not change at all if CTR is separable i.e. of the type CT R ij = γ j e i ; the analysis also remains the same if we replace the bid v m by revenue v m e m . Further, we study the incentives modeling the auction with fairness as one shot game of complete information, where the advertisers know others' bids, and play the best response to others' bids. This is reasonable as the bidding process can be thought of as a continuous process, where bidders learn each other's values [6, 7, 4, 1] . Further, let K = n.
Revenue and Incentive Properties of CFFM under GFP
We start the analysis of the CFFM model with generalized first pricing. Let us recall that with this pricing a bidder is charged an amount equal to his bid value and it is not hard to obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1 GFP Payments:
Under GF P and any weighted ranking scheme such as RBB and RBR, the total payment of the bidder ranked m for fair-slots (i.e. when she is fair-active) and non-fair slots (i.e. when she is not fair-active) are respectively γv m and d m v m , where
Therefore, her total payment in n steps is
In the above lemma γ basically represents the effective click through that a qualified bidder obtains from the fair slots (in n steps) and d m represents the effective click through that the bidder m obtains from the non-fair slots (in n steps). In particular, the d m indicates how many steps the bidder m spends in specific non-fair slots. For example,
indicates that the bidder 2 spends (n − L − 1) steps in the slot (L + 2) and one step in the slot (L + 1), and so on for other bidders.
Revenue of the auctioneer under GFP
We have
Therefore, with fairness the revenue of the auctioneer(search engine) from the n bidders is
If there was no fairness, then in n steps the auctioneer would have obtained R 0 = n n m=1 γ m v m from the n bidders.
We are interested in finding that for a given η what are the conditions such that R ≥ (1 − η)R 0 with η = lL n . Therefore, we want
Clearly we have
m=1 vm , L = µn then the above inequality can be rewritten as
.
Note that for a fixed L, as n increases, µ decreases and T increases and therefore the ratio (1 − µ) T (T +S) increases and gets closer to 1.
A bid profile v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , where v m is the bid value of the mth ranked bidder, is called ω-balanced if
Note that the first condition is always satisfied if the bidders are ranked according to their bid values. Also, in the case of RBR the condition tanslates to e m v m ≥ e m+L v m+L , which is again always true. The following results about the revenue guarantee for the auctioneer under balanced-bid-profile follows from the above discussion. Further, the analysis done above is very conservative and in practice the auctioneer will do much better on revenue. But note that the above analysis for revenue comparison assumes that bidders play same bid profile as in the usual model without fairness. However, this is not too restrictive and we can assume that the auctioneer effectively implements the fairness only some part of the day unknown to the bidders and all other times the usual model without fairness is implemented so that bidders will still be playing as in the model without fairness. Later in the paper, we also do the revenue comparison under GSP at a pure Nash equilibrium point of the game where no such assumption is required. Under GFP, as we argue below there is no pure Nash equilibrium point and therefore such a comparison is not possible. The purpose of studying the revenue comparison under GFP was to warm up for the GSP and for the case that if auctioneer is interested in implementing the fairness together with the usual model without fairness some part of the day. In this case, GFP makes sense for with the bid profile remaining same, GFP makes more revenue than GSP.
Incentive Properties under GFP
The total payoff (in n steps) of the bidder m is given by
The payoff function looks similar to that in the model without fairness and it is easy to see that there is no pure Nash equlibrium bid profile as bidders can slightly(infinitesimally) decrease their bids for better payoff while retaining the same slot position. Thus from incentive point of view, GFP is not interesting, however as we find in the following sections GSP is interesting from incentive perspective and with (simplified) second pricing we can retain the structure of pure Nash equibrium bid profile as in the model without fairness and in particular a pure Nash equilibrium bid profile always exists.
Revenue and Incentive Properties of CFFM under GSP
In this section we analyze our fair model under the generalized second pricing model. Let us recall that under GSP, a bidder is charged an amount just enough to retain his current position. Let us consider a general weighted ranking function A which ranks the bidders by the quantity q m v m . For example, RBB corresponds to q m = 1 and RBR corresponds to q m = e m . With this ranking and with GSP, bidder m pays vm+1qm+1 qm
. But note that, during the steps when a bidder is not fair active, (m + 1) is not necessarily the bidder getting the slot just below m and in that case m should be charged in terms of that bidder just below her. Further, there is another occasion when (m + 1) might not get a slot just below m and this can happen when m is fair active, (m + 1) is not fair active and there is some other bidder ranked higher than m which is not fair active and in this case some bidder ranked higher than m gets the slot just below her. Since the auctioneer is not supposed to charge a bidder more than her bid value, she charges m in terms of (m + 1) i.e. . Therefore, for the fair slots the bidder m always pays in terms of (m + 1). With these observations, it is not hard to establish the following lemma. For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote s m = vm+1qm+1 qm which for the RBB case is simply v m+1 .
Lemma 4 GSP Payments: Under GSP , the total payment of the bidder ranked m for fair-slots (i.e. when she is fair-active) and non-fair slots (i.e. when she is not fair-active) are as follows:
Fair-active:
Not Fair-active:
Revenue of the auctioneer under GSP
It is easy to see that
We want R ≥ (1 − η)R 0 (assuming that bidders play same bid profile as in the usual model without fairness), which is clearly true if
If we have s m ≥ s m+L ∀m ≤ n − L, then the following is sufficient.
then the above inequality can be rewritten as
which is clearly true when η ≥ V +βU
Similar conclusions can be derived as in the case of GFP for balanced bid profiles.
Incentive Properties under GSP
The conditions for the existence of pure Nash equlibrium bid profile can easily be written and can be casted as a linear programming feasibility problem as in the one step model without fairness, however the detailed analysis is clumsy here. To simplify the analysis we change the pricing scheme slightly as follows. Note that for the non-fair slots the bidder m pays always in terms of the value of (m + 1)th bidder except only once when the bidder (m + 1) does not get the slot just below that of m. This happens when (m + 1) is fair-active but m is not and in this case the bidder just below m is min{m + L, n} + 1 and therefore she pays accordingly. But suppose we enforce a pricing scheme in which the bidder m always pays in terms of the value of (m + 1)th bidder, then the expected payments and total expected payoff (in n steps) simplify respectively to
Note that even with this new simplified pricing the above analysis of revenue properties goes through. We establish the following lemma on the structure of d m 's that enables us to compare the above payoffs to that of the original model without fairness.
The lemma follows from the above three relations. ⊓ ⊔ .
Now let us define,
From this definition, strictly decreasing nature of γ i 's and Lemma 5, it follows that
Now the payoff (utility) functions look like
which has exactly same functional form as usual one step model without fairness where θ m takes the place for γ m 's and therefore θ m 's can be interpreted as effective clique through rates for the n steps in the fair model. It is interesting to note that even though we allowed lower ranked bidders to obtain top slots, the competition for the non-fair slots keeps the effective CTRs still in the same relative order. The highest ranked bidder still gets the best service compared to others although her effective payoff might have decreased. A lower ranked bidder still gets relatively lower quality of service than the bidders above her although her payoff might have improved a lot. Following Edelman et al [6] , Varian [7] and Lahai et al. [4, 1] , this same structural form of effective CTRs allows us to note the following theorem and to derive pure Nash equilibria and in particular locally envy free equlibria (Symmetric Nash equilibria).
Theorem 7
There always exist a pure Nash equlibrium bid profile for the CFFM under (simplified) GSP.
Revenue comparison at symmetric Nash equilibria
As noted in Theorem 7, there always exist pure strategy Nash equilibria for the CFFM auction game with GSP under any weighted ranking rule A. But this existential proof does not give us insights about what equilibria might arise in practice. Edelmen et al [6] proposed a class of Nash equilibria which they call as locally envy-free equilibria and argue that such an equilibrium arises if agents are raising their bids to increase the payments of those above them, a practice which is believed to be common in actual keyword auctions. Varian [7] independently proposed this solution concept which he calls as symmetric Nash equilibria(SNE) and provided some empirical evidence that the Google bid data agrees well with the SNE bid profile. The expressions for revenues in the following are adapted from [6, 7] .
For the minimum symmetric Nash equilibrium bid profile we have
therefore, we can ensure that R ≥ βR 0 if we take
Now from proof of Lemma 5, we can observe that
; j > n therefore if we choose c such that
The same conclusion can also be reached for the maximum symmetric Nash equlibrium bid profile and for that matter for any SNE bid profile. We summarize this in the following theorem. 
Theorem 8 Let
It is clear that a finer analysis will reveal much better revenue guarantee. For example, usually the expression on right hand side in the above theorem is dominated much by j = 1, however if we look at the expression for efficiency the j = 1 term appears only once unlike all other j's and neglecting j = 1 does not noticeably change the difference in the efficiencies and therefore a better c might be achievable with this fine tuning. Also if the fair slots are not the top ones then the revenue would be much better (cf. Section 8).
Efficiency comparison
Revenue is a natural yardstick for comparing different auction forms from the viewpoint of the seller (the auctioneer), however from a social point of view yet another yardstick that is natural and may be important is efficiency, that is, the social value of the object. The object should end up in the hands of the people who value it the most. The efficiency in the adword auction model is therefore the total valuation, and turns out to be the combined profit of the auctioneer and all the bidders. Let us denote the efficiency for the model with fairness as E and that without fairness as E 0 , both for n steps combined, then
Using the lower bounds on d m from earlier sections, we get
Further, if we assume that γ m − γ m+L ≥ γ m+1 − γ m+1+L , then it is easy to see that δ 1 > δ 2 > . . . δ n . Together with δ 1 < 0, δ n > 0 it implies that there is some 1 ≤ m 0 < n such that δ m0 < 0 but δ m0+1 > 0 and we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 9
If γ m − γ m+L ≥ γ m+1 − γ m+1+L , then δ 1 > δ 2 > . . . δ n and there exists a m 0 , 1 ≤ m 0 < n such that δ m0 < 0 but δ m0+1 > 0. Now let r m = e m t m then
and we can see that depending on the values of γ i 's and r m it might even be possible to get E ≥ E 0 and hence the efficiency actually might increase or is at least within a very good fraction of the usual case without fairness. But we realize that this should be confirmed with actual data and we hope to do that in our future work.
Which slots and how many of them should be designated fair?
In all the analysis of CFFM in the earlier sections, we assumed that the fair slots are the ones at the top. The analysis for the other cases is essentially similar; however, the revenue guarantee for the auctioneer as well as higher ranked bidders can improve if we lower down the positions of fair slots. Ideally, after the initial ranking using A, the bidders and corresponding slots can be divided in to many bands and in each band some slots can be designated to be fair slots. The corresponding bands can now be treated as independent CFFMs, i.e., the bidders in a particular band participates only in the fair slots in that band and the times she is not fair active, she competes with other non fair active bidders in that band for the non-fair slots in that band. Following similar calculations as in earlier sections, it is not hard to see that the revenue of the auctioneer is better than the case when all fair slots are at the top. The auctioneer can designate the banded slots in a way to ensure some level of revenue guarantee. We might also argue that the higher ranked bidders are losing on their payoffs if the fairness is imposed. This is indeed true but they still get effective CTRs relatively better than the lowly ranked bidders. Further, to improve upon the satisfaction of higher ranked bidders what one might like to do is to designate some top slots and the corresponding bidders to be not participating for fairness. Among other bidders and slots, the CFFM is implemented. This might also motivate bidders to be among these top bidders and bid profile might go high which is better for the auctioneer. Another point that we might also like to consider is that what should be L, the number of fair slots.
From the analysis in earlier sections, we see that auctioneer can tune L so as to improve revenue, smaller the L, better off the auctioneer is. But as the auctioneer also wants to get some valuable information so as to estimate parameters such as relevance of new advertisers and do also want to give flexibility to lowly ranked bidders to figure out their valuations, she would like to keep L as big as possible. Therefore, the auctioneer can choose a suitable L to balance these two conflicting needs. For example, if n is 45 she might like to keep L = 5 or if n is 12 she might like to keep L = 2 or so. Further insights can be obtained using empirical data.
Estimating the relevance of new advertisers
One of the important concerns for search engines is that what relevance or the quality score should they assign to an advertiser who is just joining the game. CFFM automatically allows such an estimation. The auctioneer can initially assign a relevance score to the new advertiser big enough so that she qualifies for the fair slots. Now suppose this new advertiser was ranked m and let the number of times her ad was clicked during the n steps is M . If her true relevance is e then she is expected to get (γ + d m )e clicks, therefore e can be estimated as M γ+dm and the deviation will not be high as can be argued using Chernoff bound arguments. Of course, we would like to note that there can be several other ways for estimating the relevance of new advertisers even in the standard model without fairness. In particular, one such simple scheme is recently proposed [8] .
Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In the present work, we have introduced a notion of fairness in the adword model wherein some slots are designated as fair and the qualified bidders are given an equal chance to appear in the fair slots. Therefore, with fairness, the lowly ranked bidders are also given the chance to obtain top/higher slots. This increases the payoffs for such bidders and most importantly allow them to figure out their valuations as well. This can potentially result in attracting the pools of advertisers from the tail. High budget bidders are also not worse off because the fair slots need not necessarily be at the top and there can be various pools of fair slots scattered throughout where in advertisers might be given chance to obtain better slots but not necessarily the top ones depending on their bids and other parameters. Also, since the bidders are still competing for the non-fair slots, the relative order of the effective click through rates remains same as in the usual model without fairness. Further, although the risk from lower budget advertisers seems to be shifting to the auctioneer, the auctioneer does not lose significantly in terms of revenue and most importantly she is automatically able to obtain substantial information such as estimating the quality scores of new advertisers and can potentially test a new pool of advertisers which might lead to an efficient monetization from the tail by minimizing her, as well as, their risks of loosing a potential revenue in the case of unknown or wrongly estimated scores and valuations. Furthermore, the fair slots can be chosen such that the auctioneer guarantees a certain level of its revenue as compared to the framework without fairness. Additionally, the social value (efficiency) might actually increase.
We have studied the mechanisms for implementing our notion of fairness in game theoretic setting and analyzed the revenue and incentive properties and have justified the above claims. However, we emphasize the need of testing the results and estimating various quantities in the results with empirical data and we hope to do this in our future work. Further, there can be many other ways of defining and implementing the notion of fairness and such possibilities should also be explored and analyzed in comparison to the simplicity and efficacy of the present notion and methods. Yet another direction motivated by the present work is what we call eventually fair mechanisms. Consider a model where the auctioneer allows the bidders to change their bids in a specific manner -the bidder who won the first slot is not allowed to change her bid in the next step (i.e. next query) but all other bidders increase their bids by a fraction specified by the auctioneer or alternatively, the bidder who won the last slot is not allowed to change her bid in the next step but all other bidders decrease their bids by a fraction or some variant of such rules. It is not hard to argue by inductive arguments that after finitely many steps, depending on the fraction, the mechanisms become fair in the sense that in later steps every bidder gets equal chance to get to each slots. The game theoretic study of such models should be interesting.
